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Abstract
Most of the assets on the balance sheet of a typical bank are illiquid. This
exposes the bank to liquidity risk, which is one of the key risks for banks. Since
the value of assets is determined by their risks, liquidity risk should be included in
their valuation. Although in the literature models have been developed to include
liquidity risk in the pricing of traded assets, these techniques do not easily extend to
truly illiquid or non-traded assets. This paper develops a valuation framework for
liquidity risk for these illiquid assets. Liquidity risk for illiquid assets is identified
as the risk of being liquidated at a discount in a liquidity stress event (LSE).
Whether or not an asset is liquidated depends on the liquidation strategy of the
bank. The appropriate strategy for valuation purposes is shown to be a pro rata
liquidation. The main result is that the discount rate used for valuation includes
a liquidity spread that is composed of three factors: 1. the probability of an LSE,
2. the severity of an LSE, and 3. the liquidation value of the asset.
1 Introduction
One of the main risks of a bank is liquidity risk. This is reflected by, for instance,
the inclusion of liquidity risk measures in the Basel 3 framework ([BCBS(2010)]).
Already before Basel 3 the BIS issued the paper “Principles for Sound Liquidity
Risk Management and Supervision” ([BIS(2008)]), aimed at strengthening liquid-
ity risk management in banks. The BIS-paper stresses the importance of liquidity
risk as follows: “Liquidity is the ability of a bank to fund increases in assets and
∗Earlier versions of this paper were titled “Discounting Cashflows of Illiquid Assets on
Bank Balance Sheet” .
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meet obligations as they come due, without incurring unacceptable losses. The
fundamental role of banks in the maturity transformation of short-term deposits
into long-term loans makes banks inherently vulnerable to liquidity risk, both of
an institution-specific nature and those affecting markets as a whole.”
Since liquidity risk may result in actual losses, this paper argues it should
be included in the valuation of balance sheet items. This paper assumes that
the liabilities are liquid and as such are valued consistently with market prices.
Instead the impact of liquidity risk on the valuation of assets is considered. The
aim is to develop a valuation framework for liquidity risk that can be applied
consistently across the different assets on a bank balance sheet. In particular the
aim is to include derivatives, other traded assets, but also banking book assets.
Banking book assets are held at historical cost and therefore their valuation is not
required for financial reporting. Nevertheless valuation is important to calculate
sensitivities such as duration and PV01’s. Valuation of banking book assets is also
important to determine profitability of assets. Therefore, although for accounting
purposes valuation of banking book items is not relevant, these are included in the
valuation framework developed here.
In the literature a number of approaches to include liquidity risk or the liquidity
of an asset have been developed. Extensions of the CAPM model with additional
betas to include the risk of changes in liquidity of an asset have confirmed that liq-
uidity risk is priced by investors, see e.g. the paper by [Acharya & Pedersen(2005)]
or the review article by [Amihud et al.(2005)]. It is useful to recall one of the basic
results that result from these CAPM extensions (see e.g. [Amihud & Mendelson(1986),
Amihud et al.(2005)]). The expected return on an asset in an economy where in-
vestors are risk-neutral an have an identical trading intensity µ is given by
R = r + µc (1.1)
where r denotes the risk-free rate and c the liquidity cost of trading the asset as a
fraction of its price. The application of this basic result to illiquid assets requires
a re-interpretation ([Amihud et al.(2005)]). In that case µ may be interpreted as
the probability of a liquidity shock. In a liquidity shock an investor will need to
liquidate the asset and encounters a cost c. In this paper the event of a liquidity
shock will be called a liquidity stress event (LSE) which includes both systemic
liquidity shocks as well as idiosyncratic (firm-specific) events.
However this result cannot be applied directly to the valuation of assets on
bank balance sheets for three reasons: 1) for illiquid assets there does not need to
be a market and therefore no equilibrium price. The valuation of a bank should
determine the price at which the bank is willing to buy or sell. 2) A bank holds
many different assets of different liquidity. In an LSE the bank typically does not
need to sell off all its assets to meet the liquidity demand, the bank can decide
which assets to liquidate. 3) The probability of an LSE and its impact will depend
on specifics of the bank’s balance sheet. E.g. a bank whose funding consists mainly
of short-term wholesale funding has a much larger probability of an LSE (with a
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larger impact) than a bank with mostly long-term funding. These complications
are addressed in the paper.
The research in this paper is motivated by a number of questions that the
author encountered while working on projects regarding the modelling of liquidity
risk (e.g. for regulatory reporting), charging liquidity costs through Funds Transfer
Pricing and the valuation of derivatives:
1. What is the impact of liquidity risk on the valuation of illiquid assets?
2. Liquidity risk events typically involve some complex dynamics. Can assets
be valued without modelling the full complicated dynamics?
3. It is well know from research in recent years that investors do expect a
discount in the price for illiquid assets. But how do individual investors, in
this paper specifically banks, determine at what discount they are willing to
buy or sell?
4. How are the values of more or less illiquid assets related?
5. How does the funding composition affect the valuation including liquidity
risk? In particular, how does the inclusion of liquidity risk in the valuation
of assets relate to recent proposals to include funding costs in the valuation
of derivatives?
To address these questions this paper focuses on the discounting of cashflows
generated by the different assets. It is recognized that the discounting of cashflows
of assets is determined by their liquidity through the possibility that the bank
has to liquidate (a fraction of) the asset in the event of liquidity stress. As a
consequence the discount rate includes a liquidity spread. The main result of this
paper is that the liquidity spread is composed of the probability of a liquidity
stress event (an event in which the bank is forced to sell some of its assets), the
severity of the liquidity stress event, and the liquidation value of the asset.
The outline of this paper is as follows: Firstly, section 2 develops a liquidity
risk valuation framework and discusses some consequences. Section 3 extends the
model to include credit risk and optionality. Section 4 considers the impact of the
funding composition. In section 5 a paradox is discussed and as an example the
value of the assets on Barclays and UBS balance sheet (per Q3 2014) is calculated.
Lastly the conclusions are summarized.
2 Liquidity Risk Valuation Framework
2.1 First pass: Liquidity risk and valuation
In recent years the impact of liquidity risk on pricing of assets has been studied. In
particular, research has been done to extend the CAPM model to include liquidity
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risk, such as the work of [Acharya & Pedersen(2005)]. It is useful to recall these
extensions to clarify the differences with the approach in this paper.
Acharya and Pedersen define a stochastic illiquidity cost Ci for security i that
follows a normal process in discrete time. The illiquidity cost is interpreted as the
cost of selling the security. Furthermore it is assumed that an investor buying a
security at time t will sell the security at time t + 1. Liquidity risk in this model
comes from the uncertainty of the cost of selling the security. With this set-up
Acharya and Pedersen derive a liquidity-adjusted CAPM with three additional
betas.
Although the extension of CAPM including liquidity risk is useful to under-
stand prices of traded assets, such as securities, it not easily extend to the valuation
of most of the assets on a bank’s balance sheet. One reason is that most of these
assets are not traded. Loans, mortgage, and other assets in the banking book are
intended to be held to maturity. Hence assuming the asset will be sold and assum-
ing a stochastic cost is not appropriate for these assets. Even assets in the trading
book may not be traded. For instance OTC derivatives, whose market risks will be
hedged through trading hedge instruments, may well be held to maturity. Hence
the CAPM approach, which assumes that an asset needs to be sold and model
liquidity risk by stochastic liquidity costs, is not appropriate for most assets on a
bank balance sheet.
The question is how these assets that are intended to be held to maturity are
sensitive to liquidity risk. Whatever the changes in liquidity cost, as long as these
assets are held to maturity as intended, their pay-off is not affected by liquidity
risk. Therefore it seems that these assets are not sensitive to liquidity risk, which
would imply that liquid and illiquid assets with the same pay-off should have the
same value.
The resolution this paper proposes is that, although the assets may be intended
to be held to maturity, when the bank is experiencing a liquidity stress event, the
bank may be forced to liquidate some of its assets at a discount. Therefore the
pay-off generated by the asset may be lower than the contractual pay-off when a
bank is exposed to liquidity risk. This discount should be reflected in the value of
the asset. It is clear that an illiquid asset, which has a larger discount in a forced
liquidation than a liquid asset, will have a lower value (when they have the same
contractual pay-off).
These considerations lead to the following definition of liquidity risk:
Liquidity risk is the risk for an event to occur, that would force a bank to
liquidate some of its assets.
Such an event can therefore be termed a liquidity stress event (LSE). In the
next section, a simple model for such events is proposed.
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2.2 Liquidity Risk Model
In this paper LSEs are modelled as random events. The model consists of three
components:
• The probability that an LSE occurs: PL(t1, t2) will denote the probability
of such an event between t1 and t2.
• The severity of an LSE. The severity will be indicated by the fraction of
the assets that a bank needs to liquidate f . By definition 0 ≤ f ≤ 1. For
simplicity f will be assumed to be a fixed (non-random) number.
• The dependence structure of LSEs and other events. The model assumes
that LSEs are independent from each other and from other events such as
credit risk or market risk events.
In particular, the model assumes that LSEs follow a Poisson process with a con-
stant intensity p ≥ 0, which implies for an infinitesimal time interval dt
PL(t, t+ dt) = pdt. (2.1)
This set-up simplifies the complicated dynamics of an LSE to the probability
that the event occurs and the fraction of assets that the bank needs to liquidate
in such an event. This simplification is justified since, the return of the asset to
the bank is only affected by whether or not it needs to be liquidated. Hence the
value of an asset depends on above effective parameters.
Of course, more insight in the liquidity risk of a bank is obtained by considering
all potential contributors, such as retail deposits run-off, wholesale funding risk,
collateral outflows, intraday risks etc. However for the valuation of an asset it only
matters if and when it gets liquidated, not if the liquidation is a result of retail
deposits or wholesale funding withdrawal.
The interpretation of above model is that the bank gets hit at random times
by an LSE. In particular, the bank has at any time the same risk of being hit
by an LSE, there is no notion of increased risk. An extension of the model that
would support multiple states, such as “high risk” and “low risk” with different
probabilities of an LSE and some probabilities to migrate from one state to the
other, might be more realistic, but would also have many more parameters to
calibrate. As discussed later, the lack of traded instruments to hedge liquidity
risk make it difficult to calibrate the parameters to traded market instruments.
Because of the inherent difficulties to calibrate parameters for liquidity risk, this
paper chooses the above set-up with a minimum of parameters that needs to be
assessed.
2.3 Valuation with liquidity risk
In an LSE a bank will liquidate some of its assets. These assets will be sold at a
discount depending on the liquidity of the asset. The realization of this discount
5
in case of an LSE may be recognized by defining an effective pay-off.
Effective pay-off =
{
contractual pay-off if no LSE occurs
stressed value if LSE occurs
(2.2)
The contractual pay-off includes all cashflows of the asset, for example optionality,
cashflows in case of default, cashflows if triggers are hit etc.
The stressed value includes the discount for liquidating part of the position in
the LSE. In case of a single LSE at time τ the stressed value may be expressed as
stressed value = fAV (τ)LV + (1− fA)V (τ), (2.3)
where V (τ) is the fair value of the asset at time τ , fA is the fraction of the asset
that the bank will liquidate, and LV is the liquidation value as a fraction of the
fair value of the asset. It is assumed here that assets are divisible and any part of
the assets can be liquidated.
The fraction fA of the asset that the bank will liquidate will be determined by
a liquidation strategy. In the next section the liquidation strategy that should be
used in valuation is derived.
Definition: The value of an asset under liquidity risk is defined as the present
value of the effective pay-off
V = PV [Effective pay-off] (2.4)
Consider a cashflow of an illiquid asset at some future time T . In absence of
default risk the value at time t of the cashflow is related to the value at time t+dt
through
V (t) = e−rdtV (t+dt)(1−pdt)+e−rdt[fAV (t+dt)LV +(1−fA)V (t+dt)]pdt (2.5)
The first term on the r.h.s. is the contribution from the scenario that no LSE occurs
between t and t+dt, the second term is based on (2.3) and is the contribution from
the scenario that an LSE occurs. The contribution from multiple LSEs between t
and t+dt may be neglected as long as p is finite, since this contribution is of order
(pdt)2 and dt is an infinitesimal time period.
Equation (2.5) may be rewritten as
V (t) = e−rdtV (t+ dt)[1− p(1− LV )fAdt] . (2.6)
By introducing a liquidity spread
l = p(1− LV )fA , (2.7)
this becomes
V (t) = e−rdtV (t+ dt)(1− ldt). (2.8)
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The value of a cashflow at a future time T of notional 1 in absence of default
risk is derived by iterating (2.8)
V = e−(r+l)T , (2.9)
since limdt↓0(1− ldt)T/dt = e−lT .
The liquidity spread (2.7) used in discounting depends on the fraction of the
asset fA that a bank liquidates, this fraction will be determined in the next section.
2.4 Liquidation strategy
Consider a balance sheet with a set of assets Ai with i = 1, 2, ..., N , where Ai de-
notes the market value and each asset has a unique liquidation value LVi. Without
loss of generality an ordering of the assets can be assumed: LVi > LVj if i < j.
Definition: A liquidation strategy for a set of assets Ai is a set of fractions si
of assets to sell such that
N∑
i=1
siAi = f
N∑
i=1
Ai. (2.10)
with 0 ≤ si ≤ 1 and the sum over i covers all assets on the balance sheet. Here Ai
denote the market values of the assets.
Such a strategy could be, for instance, to sell the most liquid assets until suf-
ficient assets have been liquidated to reach f
∑
iAi. Note that the strategy is
allowed to depend on the order of the assets, but not on the liquidation values
LVi. The motivation is that a bank’s liquidation strategy will be, more likely, of
the type to liquidate assets based on their relative liquidity (e.g. most liquid assets
first) instead of on their exact liquidation values.
Definition: An admissible liquidation strategy is a strategy s∗i such that the
liquidity spreads implied by the strategy
li = p(1− LVi)s∗i , (2.11)
satisfy the condition that for any set LVi
LVi < LVj ⇒ li > lj . (2.12)
Definition: An optimal admissible liquidation strategy is an admissible liqui-
dation strategy with the lowest loss in an LSE. This loss is defined as
loss =
∑
i
siAi(1− LVi) . (2.13)
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To demonstrate that the optimal admissible liquidation strategy is given by
s∗i = s
∗
j for all i, j, it first needs to be noted that a strategy with si > sj for
i < j is not an admissible strategy. Consider e.g. s1 > s2. Then the choice
LV1 = LV2+
s1−s2
2s1
(1−LV2) implies l1 > l2. (It can be checked that this expression
for LV1 is a valid choice in the sense that LV1 > LV2 and LV1 < 1.) Therefore
s1 > s2 violates the requirement (2.12). Note that the same reasoning can be
applied to any i, j with i < j, and that it is sufficient to have one choice of LV’s
that violates (2.12), since definition (2.12) should hold for any set LV’s.
It can be concluded that the set of admissible liquidation strategies may be
characterized by: s1 ≤ s2 ≤ s3 ≤ ... ≤ sN , where N denotes the last asset. Within
this set the optimal choice is s1 = s2 = s3 = ... = sN , since it will lead to the
lowest loss for the bank in an LSE. The conclusion is that the optimal admissible
strategy is specified by s1 = s2 = s3 = ... = sN = f .
The final step in the completion of the valuation framework is the determi-
nation what fraction of an asset f in (2.7) a bank will liquidate in an LSE. The
optimal admissible liquidation strategy has been defined to determine this frac-
tion. It is the natural choice for valuation of possible liquidation strategies, since it
preserves the relation between liquidation values and liquidity spreads (2.12) and
within this admissible set minimizes the loss of the liquidation of assets.
2.5 Summary of the model
Putting the above liquidity risk model, valuation approach and optimal admissible
liquidation strategy together the result is the following.
A cashflow at time T of an asset Ai without default risk should be discounted
with the discount factor
DF = e−(r+li)T , (2.14)
where the liquidity spread is given by
li = p(1− LVi)f. (2.15)
Note that the discount factor of the cashflow depends on the liquidity of the asset
that generates the cashflow through LVi. The other two factors, the probability of
an LSE p and the severity of an LSE f , are not asset specific, but are determined
by the balance sheet of the bank.
Note that the model is consistent with the basic CAPM result (1.1) mentioned
in the introduction when the fraction f = 1, and the liquidity cost c is identified
as the liquidity discount in an LSE: c = 1− LV .
2.6 Some consequences of the model
A consequence of (2.15) is that liquidity spreads of different assets (on the same
balance sheet) are related. Since in (2.15) the probability of an LSE and the
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fraction of assets that need to be liquidated are the same for all assets, it follows
immediately that
li
lj
=
1− LVi
1− LVj . (2.16)
The liquidity spread of asset i and asset j are related through their liquidation
values.
A nice feature of the model is that it allows to explain a different discount
rate for a bond and a loan. Consider, for example, a zero-coupon bond and a
loan with the same issuer/obligor, same maturity, notional, and seniority. The
zero-coupon bond and loan therefore have exactly the same pay-off (even in case
of default). Nevertheless if the zero-coupon bond is liquidly traded, a difference
in valuation is expected. The model developed here, can provide an explanation
for this difference. The above relation (2.16) shows that the liquidity spreads
are related through the liquidation values of the zero-coupon and the loan. For
example, if the probability of an LSE for a bank is estimated at 5% per year,
and the severity of the event is that 20% of the assets need to be sold, and the
liquidation value for the ZC-bond is estimated at 80% and for the loan at 0% (since
the loan cannot be sold or securitized quickly enough) then the liquidity spreads
for the bond and loan are:
lbond = 20bp, (2.17)
lloan = 100bp. (2.18)
These spreads are based on above example, and may differ significantly between
banks. Nevertheless, they clarify that it is natural in this framework that a different
discount rate is used for loans and bonds.
In this framework also the position size will affect the discount rate. Empirical
studies find a linear relation between the size of the sale and the price impact,
see e.g. [Obizhaeva(2008), Cont et al.(2012)]. In the context of this paper this
translates into a linear relation between the position size and the liquidation value:
LVi = 1− cxi (2.19)
where xi is the size of position in asset i, e.g. the number of bonds, and c a constant.
Consider a different position xj in the same asset. From (2.16) it immediately
follows that
li
lj
=
xi
xj
. (2.20)
Given a linear relation between the size of a sale and the price impact, the frame-
work derived here implies a linear relation between liquidity spread and position
size.
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2.7 Replication and Parameter Estimation
One of the important concepts in finance is the valuation of derivatives through
determining the price of a (dynamic) replication strategy. Unfortunately, liquidity
risk is a risk that cannot be replicated or hedged. In principle it is conceivable
that products will be developed that guarantee a certain price for a large sale;
e.g. for a certain period the buyer of the guarantee can sell N shares for a value
N × S, where S denotes the value of a single share. Such products would help in
determining market implied liquidation values, but it is difficult to imagine that
such products will be developed that apply to large parts of the balance sheet.
In any case, currently liquidity risk cannot be hedged. Nevertheless the risk
should be valued. Therefore it seems appropriate to use the physical probability
of an LSE and liquidation value to determine the liquidity spread in (2.15) as
opposed to an imaginary risk neutral probability and liquidation value. Clearly,
if it would be possible to hedge this risk then the risk neutral values implied by
market prices should be used.
The physical probability of LSEs and the severity of the events are required
to estimate the liquidity spread, see (2.15). These may be difficult to estimate.
Perhaps more importantly, in the absence of hedge instruments and associated
implied parameters, estimates may be less objective than desired.
On the other hand a bank should already have a good insight in the liquidity
risk it is exposed to. E.g. through stress testing a bank has insight in the impact
of different liquidity stress events. The BIS paper “Principles for Sound Liquidity
Risk Management and Supervision” ([BIS(2008)]) gives guidance to banks how
to perform stress tests. Such stress tests should provide some provide insight in
bank-specific risks, that in combination with market perception of liquidity risk
through e.g. liquidity spreads on traded instruments should provide estimates for
p and f .
3 Extensions of the model
3.1 Including Credit Risk
This section adds credit risk to the framework. Recall (2.6) with (2.7). The
inclusion of default risk is straightforward under the assumption that default events
are independent from LSEs. The result is
V (t) = e−rdtV (t+ dt)[1− ldt− pd× LGDdt] , (3.1)
where pd is the instantaneous probability of default and LGD the Loss Given
Default. By introducing a credit spread
scredit = pd× LGD (3.2)
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and solving (3.1) in a similar way as (2.6) gives the following value of a cashflow
of nominal 1
V = e−(r+l+scredit)T . (3.3)
The discount rate consists of a risk-free rate, a liquidity spread and a credit spread.
3.2 Liquidity Risk for Derivatives
Liquidity risk also affects the value of derivatives. In a Black-Scholes framework
liquidity risk results in an extra term in the PDE, see [Nauta(2013a)].
A brief derivation starts from a delta-hedged derivative’s position. Demanding
that the value of riskless portfolio of derivative’s position and delta-hedge grows
at the risk-free rate gives
dV −∆dS = r(V −∆S)dt, (3.4)
where V denotes not the value of the derivative, but the value of the derivative’s
position, as indicated above. The Delta has the usual definition: ∆ = ∂SV , and
S denotes the underlying that follows a geometric Brownian motion. Including
liquidity risk gives
dV = ∂tV dt+ ∂SV dS +
1
2
σ2S2∂2SV − f(1− LVV ) max(V, 0)dN, (3.5)
The last term on the r.h.s. is the extra term coming from liquidity risk, here N
follows a Poisson process with intensity p. LVV denotes the liquidation value of
the derivative. The max-function reflects that the value of the derivative can be
both positive and negative (depending on the type of derivative) and that only
positions with a positive value will be potentially liquidated in an LSE.
Taking the expectation of the Poisson process dN , under the assumption of
independence with dS gives
∂tV + rS∂SV +
1
2
σ2S2∂2SV = rV + lV max(V, 0). (3.6)
Here V denotes the value of the derivative’s position, S the underlying stock, σ the
volatility, and lV the liquidity spread of the derivative’s position. The last term
on the r.h.s. is the extra term coming from liquidity risk and is in fact equivalent
to the last term on the r.h.s. of (2.8). Note that it is assumed that the underlying
is perfectly liquid (in the sense that its liquidation value LV = 1).
In [Nauta(2013a)] also extensions of (3.6) are discussed that include credit risk.
A remarkable feature of (3.6) is that it is similar to models that some authors
have proposed for inclusion of funding costs in the valuation of derivatives. In
particular the extra term lV max(V, 0) has the exact same form as the term for
inclusion of funding costs derived by e.g. [Burgard & Kjaer(2011)], with funding
spread replaced by liquidity spread. The model above is more complex than the
model including funding costs since the liquidity spread is position-dependent, in
particular it may dependent on position size.
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4 Funding costs and liquidity risk
The probability and severity of an LSE for a bank is largely determined by its
funding composition. In the previous sections we treated the funding of a bank
simply as a given, which resulted in liquidity risk that should be included in the
valuation of assets. Here the funding is considered more explicitly, through two
examples:
1. adding an asset to the balance sheet that is term funded,
2. considering a special balance sheet where the income from the liquidity
spreads exactly compensates the funding spread costs.
4.1 Adding an asset that is term funded
Consider the following simple balance sheet
Ai Lj
E
where all assets Ai have the same maturity T , without optionality or coupon
payments. These could be thought of as a combination of zero coupon bonds and
bullet loans. The liabilities have varying maturities and may include for instance
non-maturity demand deposits.
Define the impact of liquidity risk on the total value of the assets as the Liq-
uidity Risk Adjustment (LRA)
LRA =
∑
i
A0i −
∑
i
Ai (4.1)
where A0i is the value of asset i without liquidity risk
A0i = Ai(li = 0) = Aie
liT (4.2)
Now consider adding an asset Anew with the same maturity T that is term
funded. The question is what is the impact on the LRA. The new LRA is
LRAnew =
∑
i
A0i −
∑
i
Anewi +A
0
new −Anew (4.3)
where Anewi is the value of asset i with the new liquidity spread after adding the
new asset and its term funding. Anew is the value of the new asset with liquidity
risk and A0new the value without liquidity risk in a similar fashion as in (4.2).
To estimate the impact on LRA the first step is to determine the new liquidity
spread. Clearly the liquidation values LVi of the assets do not change. Also the
probability of an LSE should not change, since the funding composition has not
changed for the exception of adding a liability with the same maturity as the
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assets, which therefore does not contribute to the probability of an LSE. The only
change is in the fraction of assets that need to be liquidated. Since the funding
withdrawn in an LSE is the same before or after adding the asset when the asset
is term-funded, the following relation holds:
[
∑
i
Ai +Anew]f
new = [
∑
i
Ai]f
old (4.4)
Hence the new fraction is
fnew =
∑
iAi∑
iAi +Anew
fold (4.5)
The old and new liquidity spreads are given by
loldi = p(1− LVi)fold (4.6)
lnewi = p(1− LVi)fnew (4.7)
The impact of adding the term-funded asset on the LRA is
LRAnew − LRA =
∑
i
(Ai −Anewi ) +A0new −Anew (4.8)
=
∑
i
(Ai −Aie−(lnewi −loldi )T ) +AnewelnewT −Anew (4.9)
where the relations Anewi = A
0
i e
−lnewi T , Ai = A0i e
−loldi T , and Anew = A0newe−lnewT
were used. Expanding this expression to first order in Anew/(
∑
iAi) gives
LRAnew − LRA = Anew(lnew − loldav )T, (4.10)
where loldav = (
∑
i l
old
i Ai)/(
∑
iAi). Hence, even though the new asset is term-
funded the liquidity risk adjustment does change. The reason is that the new
asset and its term funding is not isolated from the rest of the balance sheet. In an
LSE the new asset may also (partly) be liquidated. And indeed, in the liquidation
strategy derived in section 2.4 for valuation, it will be pro rata liquidated.
Equation (4.10) shows that the LRA decreases when the new asset added is
more liquid than the other assets on average.
4.2 A special balance sheet that balances funding costs
and liquidity spread income
Up to now only the valuation of assets has been considered. However a bank also
manages the income generated from these assets. From an income perspective a
bank would want that the liquidity spread it earns on its assets is (at least) equal
to the funding spreads it pays on its liabilities and equity:∑
i
liAi =
∑
j
sFj Lj + s
EE (4.11)
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where sFj is defined as the spread on liability Lj relative to the risk-free rate r and
sE the spread paid on equity.
Define the average funding spread as
sF =
∑
j s
F
j Lj + s
EE∑
j Lj + E
(4.12)
Then it is clear that (4.11) implies that the average liquidity spread equals the
average funding spread
sF = lav (4.13)
Hence the liquidity spread for asset Ai in this special case is related to the average
funding spread by
li =
(1− LVi)
(1− LVav)rF (4.14)
where LVav =
∑
i LViAi/
∑
iAi.
This suggests that in this special case a bank can charge for liquidity risk
through its funding costs when it corrects for the liquidity of the asset. In particular
• In the FTP framework of such a bank, the funding costs can be charged
for the assets, but would differentiate between funding of liquid and illiquid
assets through the factor (1−LVi)(1−LVav) . E.g. the FTP for a mortgage portfolio
would go down when a bank has securitized these (but have kept them on
the balance sheet), since liquidation value LV of securitized mortgages is
higher.
• Similarly the liquidity risk adjustment, introduced in the previous section,
of a derivative is related to the Funding Valuation Adjustment that some
authors have proposed. The LRA would however distinguish between liquid
and less liquid derivatives, such as an OTC and exchange traded option that
are otherwise the same. An example is given in [Nauta(2013a)].
Remains the question how “special” this special case is. Many banks would
recognize (4.11) as something they apply ignoring the commercial margins on both
sides of the balance sheet. However, most banks base their liquidity spreads on
their funding costs, although (4.11) may be satisfied, its the liquidity spreads do
not accurately price the liquidity risk of the bank. Nevertheless, adjusting for the
liquidity of an asset according to (4.14) may improve pricing to account for the
liquidity of the asset.
An extension of above model is developed in [Nauta(2013b)], which includes
both funding costs and liquidation losses in an LSE. A disadvantage of that model
is that it requires more parameters to calibrate, the advantage is that it allows to
determine the optimal funding term for an asset.
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5 A paradox and an example
5.1 A paradox
As discussed in section 2 the liquidity spread is determined by the loss from a forced
sale of part of the assets in a liquidity stress event. The applied sell strategy is to
sell the same fraction of each asset. In practice however one would sell the most
liquid assets as this results in a smaller loss. Since a larger loss is accounted for
in the valuation, it seems that a risk-free profit can be obtained by holding an
appropriate amount of liquid assets or cash as a buffer for a liquidity stress event.
To analyze the paradox, consider a bank with a simple balance sheet, as shown
below
A = 80 L = 80
C = 20 E = 20
This bank has 80 illiquid assets, 20 cash, and its funding consists of 80 liabilities,
and 20 equity. It is exposed to an LSE where 20% of the funding is instantaneously
removed.
If the stress event occurs the resulting balance sheet used in the valuation is
A = 64 L = 60
C = 16 E = 20
The sale of the assets will result in a loss = (1− LVA)16. This loss is born by the
equity holders, who in this setup, provide the amount (1− LVA)16. This amount
combined with the result from the sale of the assets LVA16, and a cash amount
of 4 covers the withdrawal of funding. Note that this can be viewed as a two-step
approach whereby the funding withdrawal is covered by the cash and immediately
supplemented by the sale of the assets and the cash provided by the equity holders.
In practice a bank will use its cash buffer to compensate the loss of funding.
In contrast to the strategy of the pro rata sale of assets used for valuation, this
strategy will not lead to a loss. The resulting balance sheet is
A = 80 L = 60
C = 0 E = 20
The paradox is that the value of the assets includes the possibility of a loss
(through the liquidity spread), whereas in reality this loss seems to be avoided by
using the cash as a buffer.
However, the bank is now vulnerable to a next LSE, whereby 20% of its funding
is withdrawn. To be able to withstand such an event a cash buffer of 16 is required.
To avoid any liquidity risk this buffer should be realized immediately, which can
be achieved by the same sale of assets as in the strategy for valuation, resulting in
the same loss. Therefore, to avoid any liquidity risk the same loss is born by the
equity holders, which resolves the paradox.
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Assets mGBP
Cash, balances at central banks and items in the course of collection 53,783
Trading portfolio assets 122,309
Financial assets designated at fair value 43,324
Derivative financial instruments 382,695
Available for sale financial investments 87,891
Loans and advances to banks 45,055
Loans and advances to customers 437,756
Reverse repurchase agreements and other similar secured lending 158,392
Goodwill and intangible assets 7,988
Other assets 26,537
Total assets 1,365,730
Table 1: Barclays balance sheet per 30 sep 2014
[Barclays Q3 financial tables(2014)].
In practice the assets may be sold over a larger period of time, thereby the
bank chooses to accept some liquidity risk to avoid the full loss by an immediate
sale. The optimal strategy in practice is the result of risk reward considerations.
5.2 Example for Barclays and UBS
In this section the model is applied to the balance sheets of Barclays and UBS1.
The financial data used in this section is based on the (publicly available) 2014
Q3 results: [Barclays Q3 financial tables(2014)],[Barclays Q3 report(2014)], and
[UBS Q3 financial results(2014)]. This data is not very detailed and it is clear
that the analysis can be improved when details of the balance sheet are known.
The purpose of this section is to illustrate the application of the methodology and
to show the approximate impact of liquidity risk on valuation.
In table 1 the assets on the Barclays balance sheet are shown as per 30 sep
2014.
As an LSE the 1-month event considered in the LCR is used. This is described
as a significant stress scenario and in this example a probability of 1 in 25 years is
assigned to this scenario
p = 4% . (5.1)
According to the Q3 2014 results Barclays has a liquidity pool 146b GBP and
LCR= 115%. This suggests that the impact of a stress event as considered in the
LCR has an impact of 146b/115% = 127b net cash-outflow in the 1-month stress
1The author has no connections with either Barclays or UBS. All analysis is based
solely on publicly available data.
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Assets LV l
Cash, balances at central banks and items in the course of collection 100% 0.00%
Trading portfolio assets 100% 0.00%
Financial assets designated at fair value 80% 0.13%
Derivative financial instruments 50% 0.33%
Available for sale financial investments 80% 0.13%
Loans and advances to banks 100% 0.00%
Loans and advances to customers 25% 0.49%
Reverse repurchase agreements and other similar secured lending 95% 0.03%
Goodwill and intangible assets 0% 0.65%
Other assets 0% 0.65%
Average for total assets 0.28%
Table 2: Liquidity spreads for the assets on Barclays balance sheet.
period. This results in a stress severity of
f = 127b/
∑
i
AiLVi = 16% . (5.2)
For the various assets on the balance sheet a liquidation value is estimated
based on the general description of the asset type. Note that with more detailed
information many other aspects could be taken into account to increase the ac-
curacy of the estimates, such as maturity, collateral, client/counterparty, type
of derivative, etc. The estimates for LV’s are based on regulatory factors as in
[Nauta(2013a)]. Note that for derivatives the use of regulatory factor would imply
LV = 0%, however in the examples here LV = 50% is used assuming an ap-
proximately equal part of the position consisting of liquid derivatives as of illiquid
derivatives. The estimated LV’s and the resulting liquidity spreads are summa-
rized in table 2. From table 2, it is seen that the liquidity spread ranges from 0bp
(for e.g. cash) to 65bp for illiquid assets. The average spread lav = 0.28% times
the total assets gives 3.8b which is the total compensation required for liquidity
risk per annum. This is a significant part (approx. 15%) of the net operating
income of 25b in 2013.
Not to the single out Barclays the results for UBS are included as well based
on Q3 2014 reports [UBS Q3 financial results(2014)]. The results may be found
in table 3. From table 3, it is seen that the liquidity spread ranges from 0bp (for
e.g. cash) to 91bp for illiquid assets. This variation is somewhat larger than for
Barclays. The reason is that the estimated severity of the LSE is larger with 23%.
The average spread lav = 0.38% times the total assets gives 3.9b CHF which is
the total compensation required for liquidity risk per annum. This is a significant
part (approx. 14%) of the net operating income of 28b in 2013.
Note that a standard way to include liquidity risk in an FTP framework is
to consider the opportunity cost of the liquidity pool. These costs can then be
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Assets mCHF LV l
Cash and balances with central banks 108,745 100% 0.00%
Due from banks 17,041 100% 0.00%
Cash collateral on securities borrowed 26,020 100% 0.00%
Reverse repurchase agreements 68,050 95% 0.05%
Trading portfolio assets 130,413 90% 0.09%
Positive replacement values 247,580 50% 0.45%
Cash collateral receivables on derivative instruments 31,171 100% 0.00%
Financial assets designated at fair value 5,507 80% 0.18%
Loans 310,262 25% 0.68%
Financial investments available-for-sale 55,956 80% 0.18%
Investments in associates 896 0% 0.91%
Property and equipment 6,651 0% 0.91%
Goodwill and intangible assets 6,590 0% 0.91%
Deferred tax assets 10,074 0% 0.91%
Other assets 24,301 0% 0.91%
Total assets 1,049,258 0.38%
Table 3: Liquidity spreads for the assets on UBS balance sheet.
allocated to illiquid assets or funding generating the liquidity risk. However such
an approach is not appropriate for valuation purposes, since the liquidity pool is
liquid by definition, hence the value of these assets can be observed in the market,
and there is from a valuation perspective no cost generated by the assets in the
liquidity pool.
The main observations from this exercise are that, as expected, liquidity spreads
of different assets on the same balance sheet differ significantly, liquidity spreads
between similar assets on different balance sheets may differ due to different sen-
sitivity to liquidity risk, and liquidity risk is significant.
6 Conclusions
This paper develops a liquidity risk valuation framework. It is shown that liquidity
risk of a bank affects the economic value of its assets. The starting observation
is that under an LSE the bank needs to liquidate some of its assets, which means
these will be sold at a discount. To develop the valuation framework a liquidation
strategy of the bank needs to be determined. It is shown that the optimal liqui-
dation strategy suitable for valuation is a strategy where of each asset the same
fraction is liquidated. The result is that cashflows are discounted including a liq-
uidity spread. This liquidity spread consists of three factors: the probability of an
LSE, the severity of an LSE, and the asset-specific discount in case of liquidation
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in an LSE.
The answers to the questions posed in the introduction have been addressed
in the main text. Here the answers are summarized:
1. Liquidity risk has an impact on the valuation of assets. This research shows
that the impact on the valuation is determined by the above mentioned three
factors.
2. The valuation framework in this paper does not involve modelling the com-
plex dynamics of LSEs. Determination of the probability and severity of
LSEs in combination with the liquidity of the assets is sufficient.
3. In this framework the discount that banks should use to value illiquid assets
is determined by the liquidity spread derived.
4. The framework implies that the liquidity spread of two assets on the same
balance sheet is related through a simple relation involving only the liqui-
dation values of the assets (2.16). This suggests the same relation should
hold for traded prices of liquid and less liquid assets (at least if a sufficient
number of investors trades both assets). This allows for an empirical test of
the model.
5. Liquidity risk enters the valuation of assets in a very similar way as funding
costs do in some recent proposals to include funding costs in the valuation
of derivatives.
A few other noteworthy consequences of the valuation framework developed
here:
• The value of a position is not independent of the rest of the balance sheet,
since the balance sheet determines probability of an LSE and the severity
of an LSE. In particular the same position on two different balance sheets
may be valued differently.
• Two pay-offs that are exactly the same, but have a different liquidity may
be valued differently. For example, a bullet loan and a zero-coupon bond
of the same obligor/issuer with the exact same pay-off will have different
liquidity spreads if the zero-coupon bond is liquidly traded (and the bullet
loan is not).
• The size of a position affects the valuation. E.g. if a position in bonds
is large compared to the turnover in an LSE, the liquidation value of the
position may be lower than the liquidation value of a single bond. Therefore
a large position will have a higher liquidity spread than a small position.
• The securitization of illiquid assets, such as loans and mortgages, into more
liquid securities enhances the value of the assets. Within the liquidity risk
valuation framework developed here, it is possible to estimate this value.
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